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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Final Judgment forming the basis of this appeal 
was entered on August 4, 1987, in the Sixth Circuit Court of 
Tooele County of the State of Utah and Constitutes a judgment 
from which an appeal may be taken as defined by Section 77-35-26 
and Rule 26 of the Utah Code Annotated. 
A Notice of Appeal meeting the requirements of Rule 3 
of the Rules of the Court of Appeals was timely filed within the 
time allowed by Rule 4. 
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
In October, 1986, defendant appellant Layne Kenneth 
Lundstrom was arrested for Driving on Revocation. The matter 
did not come to trial until April 20, 1987, at which time the 
arresting officer failed to appear. Instead of dismissing the 
case at that time, the judge continued it to a future date. 
At the trial held June 26, 1987, the arresting officer was 
present and gave testimony. During the trial, the prosecutor 
introduced into evidence a rap sheet which showed that defendant 
had once been convicted of embezzlement in the federal courts. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
The following issues are presented for appeal: 
1. Was defendant's Constitutional right to a speedy 
trial denied him by the Court in delaying eight months in trying 
the matter? 
2. Did the Court err in permitting the introduction 
into evidence of prior unrelated crimes: to-wit: embezzlement? 
3. Was the appellant denied due process when the 
arresting officer failed to appear for trial and the Court 
continued the case instead of dismissing it? 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION, AMENDMENT V. 
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION, AMENDMENT VI 
UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE, RULE 55 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This appeal is from a Final Judgment entered in the 
Sixth Circuit Court for Tooele County, State of Utah, by the 
Honorable Edward A. Watson. Particularly, this appeal quest-
ions the Court's finding of guilty agaittst appellant where the 
Court did not bring him to trial for ei£ht months, continued 
the case instead of dismissing it when appellant's accuser 
was not present for trial, and at trial introduced into evi-
dence over appellant's objection a prior unrelated charge. 
DISPOSITION AT TRIAL 
Appellant was found guilty of Driving on Revocation 
P a£ e 
6,7 
5 
6 
and sentenced to 60 days in jail and a fine of $1,000.00. He 
was put on 1 year's probation with Adult Probation and Parole 
and the Court suspended all but two days of the jail and $600 
of the fine. 
STATMENT OF FACTS 
On October 24, 1986, Appellant Layne Kenneth 
Lundstrom was arrested in Tooele County, State of Utah, for 
Driving on Revocation. He plead not guilty to the charge and 
the matter was set down for trial. However, trial in the matter 
was not held until April 20, 1987, at which time the arresting 
officer failed to appear. Instead of dismissing the case at 
that time, the judge continued the trial to a future date. 
The trial was held on June 26, 1987, more than eight 
months after appellant's arrest. At the trial, the arresting 
officer was present and gave testimony. The prosecuting attorney 
attempted to intorduce into evidence a rap sheet which showed 
appellant had once been convicted of embezzlement in the fed-
eral courts, and over appellant's objection, it was admitted 
into evidence. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Mr. Lundstrom makes the appeal asserting that the 
trial Court erred in continuing his trial date when his accuser 
did not appear at the earlier trial date set, and that his Con-
stititional Right to a speedy trial was denied in the Court 
delaying a total of eight months until t^ rial. Furthermore, he 
asserts that the introduction into evidence during the trial of 
a prior unrelated crime was violative of the Utah Rules of 
Evidence. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
It is the position of the appellant that his Consti-
tutional Right to a speedy trial guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment 
was denied him by the Court in delaying more than eight months 
after appellant's arrest before bringing the matter to trial. 
The United States Supreme Court has ruled in the land-
mark case of Barker vs. Wingo. 407 U.S. 514 (1972), that whether 
or not a case must be dismissed for lackj of a speedy trial requires 
a balancing test. The conduct of both the defendant and the pros-
ecution are weighed and such factors as length of delay, reason 
for the delay, defendant's assertion or non-assertion of right, 
and prejudice to the defendant are considered. The Utah State 
Supreme Court has adopted this test in State vs. Hafen, 593 P2d 
538. 
Appellant's contention is thatt eight months is a delay 
of sufficient length to be prejudicial ^nd that any other factors 
considered by the Court do not erase th^ prejudice. No factors 
regarding a justifiable reason for the delay have been brought to 
appellant's attention. 
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Although the defendant appellant might not have raised 
the speedy trial issue by motion before trial, this does not pre-
clude him from raising the issue on appeal. Furthermore, appellant 
asserts that there was substantial prejudice to him by reason of 
the lengthy delay. Not only was there great anxiety sustained by 
the accused over this amount of time, he was also prevented from 
making various living and job arrangements because of his lack of 
certainty over whether or not he would have his driver's license 
further revoked, or his driving privilege reinstated. 
POINT II 
Appellant further contends that the permitting of the 
prosecutor to enter into evidence during trial a rap sheet of a 
conviction in federal court of embezzlement was improper. Rule 
55 of the Utah Rules of Evidence state that evidence that a per-
son committed a crime or civil wrong on a specified occasion is 
inadmissible to prove his disposition to commit a crime or civil 
wrong on another specified occasion. Therefore, there was no 
valid reason for the Court having allowed the introduction of 
said evidence. 
POINT III 
Appellant further avers that his Constitutional rights 
of Due Process as guaranteed in the Fifth Amendment to the Con-
stitution and made applicable to the states through the Four-
-6-
teenth Amendment were denied him when the prosecutor's accusing 
witness against appellant was not present for trial on April 20, 
1987, and the Court continued the case instead of dismissing it. 
Fundamental standards of fairness would dictate that under the 
circumstances to which are referred, th^ case against appellant 
would be dismissed, where he is present with his attorney and 
prepared to go forward on the date and time scheduled by the 
Court. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, it is respectfully requested 
that the appellant's conviction for Driving on Revocation be re-
versed and the case be dismissed. 
Respectfully submitted this £L day of November, 1987. 
RONALD H. GOODMAN —^ 
Attorney for Appellant 
La^ne Kenneth Lundstrom 
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THE U. S. CONSTITUTION 
AMENDMENT 11(1791]. 
A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, 
the right of the people to keep and bear Amis, shall not be infringed. 
AMENDMENT HI [1791]. 
No Soldier shall, in time of peace be quartered in any house, without the 
consent of the Owner, nor in time of war| but in a manner to be prescribed 
by law. 
AMENDMENT JV[1791]. 
The right of the people to be secure ill their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, 
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or 
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the 
persons or things to be seized. 
AMENDMENT: V[1791], 
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous 
crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in 
cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual 
service in time of War or public danger; nor shall any person be subject 
for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall 
be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be 
deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall 
private property be taken for public use, without just compensation. 
AMENDMENT VI[1791]. 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy 
and public trial by an impartial jury of the State and district whereifTthe 
crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously 
ascertained by law, and to be '"f^ TflfH n f fha nptnrp n^f* .r^sp nf the accu-
sation ; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compul-
sory process for obtaining Witnessejs in his favor, and to have the Assist-
ance of Counsel for his defence. 
• AMENDMENT VII[1791]. 
In Suits at common law, where! the value in controversy shall exceed 
twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact 
tried by a jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United 
States, than according to the rules of the common law. 
AMENDMENT VIII [1791]. 
Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor 
cruel and unusual punishments inflicted. 
AMENDMENT IX[1791]. 
The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be con-
strued to deny or disparage other^ retained by the people. 
xcvii 
Evidence R. 54, 55 6-105 
Utah Decisions: 
Comparable 
Provisions: 
insurance where relevant upon an issue 
other than the quality of the insured's con-
duct. 
Kan. Stat. § 60-454 and NJ.R.E. 53 are 
identical with the Utah Rule. Cal. Evid. 
Code § 1155 is essentially identical to the 
Utah Rule. 
Rule 55. Other Crimes or Civil Wrongs 
Utah Rule: 
Utah Note: 
Uniform Rule: 
Subject to Rule 47 evidence that a person 
committed a crime or civil wrong on a 
specified occasion, is inadmissible to prove 
his disposition to commit crime or civil 
wrong as the basis for an inference that he 
committed another crime or civil wrong on 
another specified occasion but, subject to 
Rules 45 and 48, such evidence is admissi-
ble when relevant to prove some other 
material fact including absence of mistake 
or accident, motive, opportunity, intent, 
preparation, plan, knowledge or identity. 
The generally accepted rule prohibits evi-
dence of another crime or civil wrong as 
proof that a person committed a crime or 
civil wrong on a specified occasion. The 
things set forth above are only exemplary 
and not exclusive. 
Identical with Utah Rule. 
Uniform Comment: This states the generally accepted rule re-
jecting evidence of another crime or civil 
wrong as proof that a person committed a 
crime or civil wrong on a specified occasion. 
The limitation is directed against the idea 
that when it is shown that a person com-
mitted a crime on a former occasion there 
arises an inference that he has a disposition 
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it is unnecessary to be concerned with the 
issue as to whether, and to what extent, Mr. 
Meikle was the agent of defendant First 
Colony, and w h^at may or n|iay not have 
been said between him and the Williamses 
inconsistent with the terms 0f the condi-
tional receipt. 
It is indeed unfortunate that Mr. Wil-
liams died prior to taking the scheduled 
physical examination. Nevertheless, we are 
impelled to the conclusion tha|t under facts 
which appear Without dispute, there is no 
basis upon whi<fch any liability for that mis-
fortune can justly be imposed upon the 
defendant insurance company.t 
Affirmed. Costs to defendant 
MAUGHAN, WILKINS and HALL, J J., 
concur. 
STEWART, t , having disqualified him-
self, does not participate herein. 
KEY NUMBER SYSTEM) 
1. Criminal Law <&=»577.10(3) 
Where felony defendant did no 
first motion to dismiss for lack oi 
trial until after he had been remov 
jurisdiction, defendant was outside 
diction for four and a half months, 
delay in prosecution was due to def 
own actions such as refusing public 
er as counsel and appointment of ne 
sel on his return to jurisdiction, and 
ant's defense was not substantia 
paired by pretrial delay, there was i 
tional delay of an oppressive chara 
suiting in prejudice to defendant 
fendant's right to speedy trial ^ 
abused. 
2. False Pretenses <&=»52 
Where defendant who was on 1 
theft by deception offered no eviden 
his intent involved in subject trail 
and offered no evidence that he hac 
to believe or did believe that checl 
be paid upon presentment for paym< 
al court's failure to give defenda 
quested jury instruction referring tc 
ic intent to defraud was not error. 
1953, 76-6-405. 
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and 
Respondent, 
v. 
Darrell Graff HAFEN, Defendant 
and Appellant 
No. 15885. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
March 22, 1979. 
Defendant was convicted before the 
Third District Court, Salt LaKe County, 
Dean Conder, J., of theft by deception. De-
fendant appealed. The Supijeme Court, 
Hyde, J., held that: (1) defendant was not 
denied a speedy trial, and (2) trial court did 
not err in failing to give defendant's re-
quested jury instruction referring to specif-
ic intent to defraud. 
Affirmed. 
Craig Stephens Cook, Salt Lake C 
defendant and appellant 
R. Paul VanDam, Salt Lake Ci 
plaintiff and respondent 
HYDE, District Judge: 
The defendant Darrell Graff HaJ 
peals his conviction by a jury of Tl 
Deception, in violation of 76-6-405, 
1953. His claims of error are: 
(1) that he was denied a speed] 
and 
(2) that the trial court erred in f ai 
give defendant's requested jury i 
tion referring to specific intent 
fraud. 
Concerning defendant's contentioi 
he was not given a speedy trial, the 
tial facts are these: A State complai 
STATE v. 
Cite as 593 
filed against the defendant March 4, 1977, 
** A a. warrant was issued thereon. Def end-
*jjt was brought to Salt Lake City in July 
of 197? from New York State. On July 11, 
1977 defendant was detained in the Salt 
rake County Jail pursuant to the com-
olaint On that same date, defendant was 
brought before the City Court, where the 
complaint was read and bail set at $50,-
000.00. The defendant, present without 
counsel, was referred to the Legal Defender 
attorney. The court also at that time or-
dered hearing set for July 26, 1977. 
On July 27, 1977, defendant appeared 
without counsel and moved for a mistrial. 
The motion was denied. Defendant's mo-
tion for the court to appoint private counsel 
was also denied. Defendant at that time 
objected to the State proceeding further in 
the matter because a motion to transfer 
jurisdiction to the United States District 
Court had been filed. A handwritten mo-
tion to stay proceedings before the City 
Court until Chief Judge Willis Ritter could 
rule on jurisdiction was filed by the defend-
ant on July 28,1977. The July 27th hearing 
was continued to August 9 because of evac-
uation of the building due to a gasoline 
leak. On August 9,1977, the attorney from 
the Legal Defender's office appeared on 
behalf of the defendant, and informed the 
court that the Federal Government had re-
moved the defendant from jail and trans-
ported him to Los Angeles County in Cali-
fornia, pursuant to a Writ of Habeas Cor-
pus Ad Prosequendum, and at that time 
filed a motion and demand for a speedy 
trial. The court ordered the hearing contin-
ued to August 23rd on stipulation. 
On August 23rd, the defendant was not 
present in court, and the hearing was there-
fore continued to October 11, 1977. On 
September 19, 1977, defendant's attorney 
appeared without defendant and moved for 
a dismissal based upon the failure to obtain 
a speedy trial. The motion was denied, and 
hearing was continued to October 11, 1977, 
the attorney appeared without defendant 
and the court was told that defendant was 
still in California. A motion to dismiss was 
again made, and denied. The court ordered 
a continuation of the arraignment until No-
HAFEN Utah 539 
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vember 11, 1977. On November 11, the 
court ordered the arraignment continued to 
December 9. On December 11, 1977, by 
stipulation of counsel, the court ordered the 
hearing reset to December 13. On Decem-
ber 13, defendant was returned to Salt 
Lake County Jail, and appeared in court 
without counsel. He refused to let a Legal 
Defender attorney represent him. The 
court ordered his current attorney appoint-
ed to represent him, and ordered the hear-
ing continued to January 12, 1978. 
The court also ordered a bond-reduction 
hearing scheduled for December 14. This 
hearing was continued to December 15, 
wherein bail was reduced to $10,000.00. On 
January 12,1978, a preliminary hearing was 
held, at which time the defendant was 
bound over to the District Court to stand 
trial. The court ordered that the bond re-
main the same, and set an arraignment date 
in District Court for January 20, 1978. On 
January 12, 1978, appellant's present coun-
sel filed a motion for dismissal based on 
failure to provide defendant a speedy trial. 
An Information was filed by the County 
Attorney on January 19, and arraignment 
was held on January 20 before a District 
Court Judge. Trial was set for March 9, 
1978. On March 6,1978, appellant's counsel 
filed a second motion for dismissal based 
upon failure to provide defendant a speedy 
trial. Trial was held March 9th and 10th, 
1978. Defendant was able to post bond in 
January, thus being incarcerated approxi-
mately six months, including the time spent 
in California, which accounted for four and 
one-half months of that time. 
As to whether appellant's right to a 
speedy trial was violated under Federal 
law, a leading and analytical case in this* 
area is Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 92 
S.Ct 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972). In that 
case, petitioner was arrested and subse-
quently subjected to sixteen continuances 
and spent ten months in jail until he was 
able to post bond. He filed a motion to 
dismiss after the eleventh continuance, but 
the motion was denied. Four years after 
his release on bond, he was finally tried. 
At the trial, his motion to dismiss due to 
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lack of speedy trial was again delnied. The 
conviction was affirmed by the Kentucky 
Court of Appeals. Writ of Habeas Corpus 
was sought in the United States District 
Court and rejected, with leave to appeal. 
The Court of Appeals affirmed, as did the 
United States Supreme Court In so doing, 
the Supreme Court set forth certain guide-
lines to be followed in determining whether 
a defendant has been denied a speedy trial, 
and specifically rejected a fixed time period 
and demand-waiver approach: 
The approach we accept is a (balancing 
test, in which the conduct of both the 
prosecution and the defendant are. 
weighed. 
A balancing test necessarily compels 
courts to approach speedy trial cases on 
an ad hoc basis. We can do little more 
than identify some of the factors which 
the court should assess in determining 
whether a particular defendant has been 
deprived of his right Though some 
might express them in different ways, we 
identify four such factors: Length of De-
lay, the reason for the delay, the defend-
ant's assertion of his right, and prejudice 
to the defendant1 
The court went on to detail and I expound 
some of these factors: 
The length of delay is to some extent a 
triggering mechanism. Until there is 
some delay which is presumptively preju-
dicial, there is no necessity for inquiry 
into the other factors that go into the 
balance . . ., the length of delay 
that will provoke such an inquiry is nec-
essarily dependent upon the particular 
circumstances of the case. . 
Closely related to the length of delay is 
the reason . . . that justified the 
delay. Here, too, different weights 
should be assigned to different reasons. 
A deliberate attempt to delay the trial in 
order to hamper the defense should be 
weighed heavily against the government 
A more neutral reason, such as negli-
gence or over-crowded courts, shou 
weighed less heavily, but neverth 
should be considered, since the ulti 
responsibility for such circumste 
must rest with the government n 
than with the defendant Finally, a 
reason, such as a missing witness, sfr 
serve to justify appropriate delay.2 
The court spoke to the fourth crit 
prejudice to the defendant, as follows: 
. . . prejudice . . . sh 
be assessed in light of the interes 
defendant's which the speedy trial r 
was designed to protect This court 
identified three such interests: (i) to 
vent oppressive pre-trial incarcerati 
(ii) to minimize anxiety and concern 
the accused; and (iii) to limit the poss 
ity that the defense will be impaired, 
these, the most serious is the last.5 
The court finally concluded: 
We regard none of the four fac 
identified above as either necessary 
sufficient condition to the finding o 
deprivation of the right to speedy ta 
Rather, they are related factors, 
must be considered together with s 
other circumstances as may be relevs 
[1] Appellant contends that the len 
of delay must include the four and one-r 
months that he was incarcerated in Calii 
nia. It should be noted that the first i 
tion to dismiss for lack of speedy trial \ 
not filed until after the appellant had b< 
removed from the jurisdiction of Utah 
California. Whether the period of time 
considered to be the one and one-h 
months he was in the Salt Lake Coui 
Jail, or the total of six months includi 
California, does not appear to be releva 
The fact is, he was outside the jurisdicti< 
and thereby the matter could not proce< 
because he was charged with a felony a 
his presence is necessary. The reasons i 
the delay appear to be appropriate in tl 
instance. Some of the delay was due 
1. 407 U.S. 2191-2192, 92 S.Ct 523+524, 33 3. 407 U.S. 525, 92 S.Ct 2193, 33 L.Ed.2d 11 
L.Ed.2d 116, 117. 
4. Id. 
2. 407 U.S. 524, 92 S.Ct 2192, 33 L.E4-2d 117. 
STATE v. 
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appellant's own actions, such as refusing a 
Legal Defender attorney as his counsel, re-
questing appointment of private counsel, 
appointment of new counsel upon his return 
from California, and withdrawal of the 
Judge from hearing the case. 
As to the fourth factor, prejudice to the 
defendant, appellant concedes in his brief 
that his defense was not substantially im-
paired by the pre-trial delay. The delays 
were not all caused by the State, and those 
that were appear to be appropriate and 
necessary under the circumstances, and no 
prejudice resulted to appellant's trial or the 
preparation thereof. 
As to whether appellant's right to speedy 
trial under the Utah Constitution and Utah 
Statutory and Case Law was violated, 
seems to be answered in the case of State v. 
Archuletta, Utah, 577 P.2d 547, wherein it 
was stated: 
There is no doubt about the importance 
of complying with the requirements of 
both the United States and Utah Consti-
tutions. The one accused of a crime is 
entitled to prompt trial setting and dispo-
sition of the charge if he so desires and 
requests. The purpose of those Constitu-
tional provisions is to guard against any 
intentional delay which may be oppres-
sive or persecutorial in nature. In order 
to avoid any such baneful effect, the re-
quirement of the law should be respected 
and complied with insofar as can be 
achieved within the practical operation of 
the courts. However, the court does not 
lose jurisdiction because of such a delay, 
and unless there is some intentional delay 
of an oppressive character which results 
in prejudice to the defendant, the 
processes of justice should not be wholly 
defeated thereby. It is for this reason 
that this court has consistently held that 
the statutory time within which a trial 
shall be held is directory, and not manda-
tory. [Emphasis added.] 
The facts of this case do not show an 
intentional delay of an oppressive character 
resulting in prejudice to the defendant 
The defendant's right to a speedy trial was 
not abused, and the trial court was correct 
HAFEN Utah 541 
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in refusing to dismiss the action. The right 
to a speedy trial is meant to be a shield 
against oppression, and not a sword to be 
used to decapitate the processes of justice. 
The other point raised by appellant is 
that the trial court committed error in fail-
ing to give appellant's requested jury in-
struction, referring to specific intent to de-
fraud. The appellant offered a jury in-
struction which stated as follows: 
Even though one makes, draws, utters or 
delivers a check knowing that at that 
time he does not have sufficient funds in 
the bank on which it is drawn to pay it, 
he does not have the requisite specific 
intent to defraud if he in fact has good 
reason to believe and honestly does be-
lieve that it will be paid upon present-
ment for payment 
The court instructed the jury in regard to 
the elements of the offense that they must 
find beyond a reasonable doubt: 
3. The property was obtained by decep-
tion; 
4. That the defendant acted with a pur-
pose to deprive the owner of said proper-
ty. 
They were further instructed that the 
term "by deception" means: 
. . . when a person intentionally: 
a) creates or confirms by words or con-
duct an impression of law or fact that is 
false, and that the actor does not believe 
it to be true, and that is likely to affect 
the judgment of another in the transac-
tion, or 
b) fails to correct a false impression of 
law or fact that the actor previously cre-
ated or confirmed by words or conduct 
that is likely to affect the judgment of 
another, and that the actor does not now 
believe to be true. 
And further, that the term "purpose to 
deprive" means: 
. . . to have the conscious object to: 
a) withhold property permanently or for 
so extended a period, or to use under such 
circumstances that a substantial portion 
of its economic value or the use and bene-
fit thereof would be lost; or 
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b) restores the property only upon pay-
ment of reward or other compensation; 
or 
c) disposes of the property u^ ider circum-
stances that make it unlikely that the 
owner will recover it. 
The court further instructed the jury 
that: 
Knowledge or intent with which an act is 
done denotes a state of mind and con-
notes a purpose in so acting. Knowledge 
or intent being a state of mind is seldom 
susceptible of proof by direct and positive 
evidence and must ordinarily be inferred 
from acts, conduct, statements, and cir-
cumstances. 
The court further instructed the jury: 
A person acts intentionally, or with in-
tent, or wilfully with respect to the na-
ture of his conduct or to a result of his 
conduct when it is his conscious objective 
or desire to engage in the conduct or 
cause the result 
[2] Defendant offered no evidence as to 
his intent involved in this transaction, and 
offered no evidence that he had reason to 
believe or did believe that the check would 
be paid upon presentment for payment. 
Without some evidence at the trial to 
justify a requested instruction, the court is 
correct in refusing. In this instance, the 
court correctly and fully instructed the jury 
in regard to the requisite intent, and its 
refusal to give the appellant's instruction as 
phrased was not error. 
The conviction is affirmed* No costs 
awarded. 
CROCKETT, C. J., MAUGHAN and 
HALL, JJ., and GEORGE E. B^LLIF, Dis-
trict Judge, concur. 
WILKINS and STEWART, JJ., having 
disqualified themselves, do not participate 
herein. 
O I KEY NUMBER SYSTEM 
WALL INVESTMENT COMPANY, 
ited partnership, with Gordon Gn 
general partner, Plaintiff and I 
dent, 
v. 
GARDEN GATE DISTRIBUTING 
Dennis Vanderlinden, and Steve 
deriinden, Defendants and App 
No. 15766. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
March 26, 1979. 
General partnership brought act 
conversion when judgment creditor, 
obtained money judgment against r 
gor, proceeded under writ of execu 
seize mortgagor's inventory which w 
subject of a "chattel mortgage" in f 
mortgagee. The Third District Coui 
Lake County, Dean E. Conder, J., < 
judgment in favor of plaintiff, anc 
ment creditor and others appealed 
Supreme Court, Hall, J., held ths 
judgment creditor failed to meet bu: 
showing invalidity of recorded fi 
statement due to insufficient addre 
limited partnership could bring su 
partnership's early failure to compl 
assumed name statute did not disqu 
as plaintiff in suit, and (4) evident 
ported findings that seized invento 
value equal to award. 
Affirmed. 
1. Secured Transactions <s=>93 
Fact that chattel mortgage in t 
general partnership was a post offi 
did not mean that mortgage was de 
as a financing statement as a matter 
so that it would not perfect a security 
est 
2. Secured Transactions «=>101 
It is burden of party asserting ii 
ty of recorded financial statement 
feet security interest to prove insuff 
of address as a matter of fact 
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alleged accomplice so that his tes-
timony, if conviction resulted, would 
be available at petitioner's trial. Be-
fore the accomplice was finally con-
victed, he was tried six times. Peti-
tioner made no objection to the con-
tinuances until three and one-half 
years after he was arrested. After the 
accomplice was finally convicted, peti-
tioner, after further delays because 
of a key prosecution witness* illness, 
was tried and convicted. In this ha-
beas corpus proceeding the Court of 
Appeals, concluding that petitioner 
had waived his right to a speedy trial 
for the period prior to his demand 
for trial, and m any event had not been 
prejudiced by the delay, affirmed the 
District Court's judgment against peti-
tioner. Held: A defendant's constitu-
tional right to a speedy tnal cannot 
be established by any inflexible rule 
[407 US 515] 
Mr. Justice Powell delivered the 
opinion of the Court. 
[ l , 2] Although a speedy trial is 
guaranteed the accused by the Sixth 
Amendment to the Constitution,1 
this Court has dealt with that right 
on infrequent occasions. See 
Beavers v Haubert, 198 US 77, 49 
L Ed 950, 25 S Ct 573 (1905); Pol-
lard v United States, 352 US 354, 
1 L Ed 2d 393, 77 S Ct 481 (1957); 
United States v Ewell, 383 US 116, 
1. The Sixth Amendment provides: 
"In all criminal prosecutions, the accused 
shall enjoy the right to a speedy and pub-
lic trial, by an impartial jury of the State 
and district wherein the crime shall have 
been committed, which district shall have 
been previously ascertained by law, and 
to be informed of the nature and cause 
of the accusation; to be confronted with 
but can be determined only on an ad 
hoc balancing basis, in which the con-
duct of the prosecution and that of the 
defendant are weighed. The court 
should assess such factors as the 
length of and reason for the delay, the 
defendant's assertion of his right, and 
prejudice to the defendant. In this 
case the lack of any serious prejudice 
to petitioner and the fact, as disclosed 
by the record, that he did not want a 
speedy trial outweigh opposing con-
siderations and compel the conclusion 
that petitioner was not deprived of his 
due process right to a speedy trial. 
442 F2d 1141, affirmed. 
Powell, J., delivered the opinion for 
a unanimous Court. White, J., filed 
a concurring opinion, in which Bren-
nan, J., joined, post, p 536, 33 L Ed 2d 
p 120. 
15 L Ed 2d 627, 86 S Ct 773 (1966); 
United States v Marion, 404 US 307, 
30 L Ed 2d 468, 92 S Ct 455 (1971). 
See also United States v Provoo, 17 
FRD 183 (D Md), affd, 350 US 857, 
100 L Ed 761, 76 S Ct 101 (1955). 
The Court's opinion in Klopfer v 
North Carolina, 386 US 213,18 L Ed 
2d 1, 87 S Ct 988 (1967), established 
that the right to a speedy trial is 
"fundamental" and is imposed by 
the Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment on the States.2 
See Smith v Hooey, 393 US 374, 21 
the witnesses against him; to have com-
pulsory process for obtaining witnesses in 
his favor, and to have the Assistance of 
Counsel for his defence." 
2. "We hold here that the right to a 
speedy trial is as fundamental as any of 
the rights secured by the Sixth Amend-
ment." 386 US, at 223, 18 L Ed 2d 8. 
APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL 
James E. Milliman argued the cause for petitioner, pro hac vice, 
by special leave of court. 
Robert W. Willmott, Jr., argued the cause for respondent, pro 
hac vice, by special leave of court. 
Briefs of Counsel, p 845, infra. 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
BARKER 
407 US 514, 33 L Ed 
L Ed 2d 607, 89 S Ct 575 (1969); 
Dickey v Florida, 398 US 30, 26 L 
Ed 2d 26, 90 S Ct 1564 (1970). As 
Mr. Justice Brennan 
[407 US 516] 
pointed out in 
his concurring opinion in Dickey, in 
none of these cases have we at-
tempted to set out the criteria by 
which the speedy trial right is to be 
judged. 398 US, at 40-41, 26 L Ed 
2d at 33-34. This case compels us 
to make such an attempt. 
I 
On July 20, 1958, in Christian 
County, Kentucky, an elderly couple 
was beaten to death by intruders 
wielding an iron tire tool. Two 
suspects, Silas Manning and Willie 
Barker, the petitioner, were arrested 
shortly thereafter. The grand jury 
indicted them on September 15. 
Counsel was appointed on September 
17, and Barker's trial was set for Oc-
tober 21. The Commonwealth had 
a stronger case against Manning, 
and it believed that Barker could not 
be convicted unless Manning testi-
fied against him. Manning was nat-
urally unwilling to incriminate him-
self. Accordingly, on October 23, 
the day Silas Manning was brought 
to trial, the Commonwealth sought 
and obtained the first of what was 
to be a series of 16 continuances of 
Barker's trial.8 Barker made no 
objection. By first convicting Man-
ning, the Commonwealth would re-
move possible problems of self-in-
crimination and would be able to 
assure his testimony against Barker. 
The Commonwealth encountered 
more than a few difficulties in its 
prosecution of Manning. The first 
trial ended in a hung jury. A sec-
ond trial resulted in a conviction, but 
3. There is no explanation in the record 
why although Barker's initial trial was set 
for October 21, no continuance was sought 
until October 23, two days after the trial 
should have begun. 
v WINGO 109 
2d 101, 92 S Ct 2182 
the Kentucky Court of Appeals re-
versed because of the admission of 
evidence obtained by an illegal 
search. Manning v Commonwealth, 
328 SW2d 421 (Ky 1959). At 
his third trial, Manning was again 
convicted, and the Court of Appeals 
again reversed 
C407 US 5173 
because the trial 
court had not granted a change of 
venue. Manning v Commonwealth, 
346 SW2d 755 (Ky 1961). A 
fourth trial resulted in a hung jury. 
Finally, after five trials, Manning 
was convicted, in March 1962, of 
murdering one victim, and after a 
sixth trial, in December 1962, he was 
convicted of murdering the other.4 
The Christian County Circuit 
Court holds three terms each year— 
in February, June, and September. 
Barker's initial trial was to take 
place in the September term of 1958. 
The first continuance postponed it 
until the February 1959 term. The 
second continuance was granted for 
one month only. Every term there-
after for as long as the Manning 
prosecutions were in process, the 
Commonwealth routinely moved to 
continue Barker's case to the next 
term. When the case was continued 
from the June 1959 term until the 
following September, Barker, having 
spent 10 months in jail, obtained his 
release by posting a $5,000 bond. He 
thereafter remained free in the com-
munity until his trial. Barker made 
no objection, through his counsel, 
to the first 11 continuances. 
When on February 12, 1962, the 
Commonwealth moved for the 
twelfth time to continue the case un-
til the following term. Barker's 
counsel filed a motion to dismiss 
the indictment. The motion to dis-
4. Apparently Manning chose not to ap-
peal these final two convictions. 
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miss was denied two weeks later, 
and the Commonwealth's motion for 
a continuance was granted. The 
Commonwealth was granted further 
continuances in June 1962 and Sep-
tember 1962, to which Barker did 
not object. 
In February 1963, the first term 
of court following Manning's final 
conviction, the Commonwealth 
moved to set Barker's trial for 
March 19. But on the day sched-
uled for trial, it again moved for a 
continuance until the June term. It 
gave as its reason the illness 
[407 US 518] 
of the 
ex-sheriff who was the chief investi-
gating .officer in the case. To this 
continuance, Barker objected unsuc-
cessfully. 
The witness was still unable to 
testify in June, and the trial, which 
had been set for June 19, was con-
tinued again until the September 
term over Barker's objection. This 
time the court announced that the 
case would be dismissed for lack of 
prosecution if it were not tried dur-
ing the next term. The final trial 
date was set for October 9, 1963. 
On that date, Barker against moved 
to dismiss the indictment, and this 
time specified that his right to a 
speedy trial had been violated.5 The 
motion was denied; the trial com-
menced with Manning as the chief 
prosecution witness; Barker was 
convicted and given a life sentence. 
Barker appealed his conviction to 
the Kentucky Court of Appeals, rely-
ing in part on his speedy trial claim. 
The court affirmed. Barker v Com-
monwealth, 385 SW2d 671 (Ky 
1964). In February 1970 Barker 
petitioned for habeas corpus in the 
5. The written motion Barker filed al-
leged that he had objected to every con-
tinuance since February 1959. The record 
does not reflect any objections until the 
motion to dismiss, filed in February 1962, 
United States District Court for the 
Western District of Kentucky. Al-
though the District Court rejected 
the petition without holding a hear-
ing, the Court granted petitioner 
leave to appeal in forma pauperis and 
a certificate of probable cause to ap-
peal. On appeal, the Court of Ap-
peals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed 
the District Court. 442 F2d 1141 
(1971). It ruled that Barker 
had waived his speedy trial claim 
for the entire period before Febru-
ary 1963, the date on which the 
court believed he had first objected 
to the-delay by filing a motion to 
dismiss.- In this belief the court 
was mistaken, for the record re-
veals 
[407 US 519] 
that the motion was filed 
in February 1962. The Common-
wealth so conceded at oral argument 
before this Court.6 The court held 
further that the remaining period 
after the date on which Barker first 
raised his claim and before his trial 
—which it thought was only eight 
months but which was actually 20 
months—was not unduly long. In 
addition, the court held that Barker 
had shown no resulting prejudice, 
and that the illness of the ex-sheriff 
was a valid justification for the de-
lay. We granted Barker's petition 
for certiorari. 404 US 1037, 30 L Ed 
2d 729, 92 S Ct 719 (1972). 
II 
[3, 4] The right to a speedy trial 
is generically different from any of 
the other rights enshrined in the 
Constitution for the protection of 
the accused. In addition to the gen-
eral concern that all accused persons 
be treated according to decent and 
fair procedures, there is a societal 
and the objections to the continuances 
sought by the Commonwealth in March 
1963 and June 1963. 
6. Tr of Oral Arg 33. 
BARKER 
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interest in providing a speedy trial 
which exists separate from, and at 
times in opposition to, the interests 
of the accused. The inability of 
courts to provide a prompt trial 
has contributed to a large back-
log of cases in urban courts 
which, among other things, en-
ables defendants to negotiate 
more effectively for pleas of guil-
ty to lesser offenses and other-
wise manipulate the system.7 In 
addition, persons released on bond 
for lengthy periods awaiting trial 
have an opportunity to commit other 
crimes.8 It must be of little comfort 
to the residents of Christian County, 
Kentucky, to know that Barker was 
at large on bail for over four years 
while accused of a vicious 
[407 US 520] 
and brutal 
murder of which he was ultimately 
convicted. Moreover, the longer an 
accused is free awaiting trial, the 
more tempting becomes his opportu-
nity to jump bail and escape.9 Fi-
nally, delay between arrest and pun-
ishment may have a detrimental 
effect on rehabilitation.10 
If an accused cannot make bail, 
he is generally confined, as was 
Barker for 10 months, in a local jail. 
v WINGO 111 
2d 101, 92 S Ct 2182 
This contributes to the overcrowd-
ing and generally deplorable state of 
those institutions.11 Lengthy ex-
posure to these conditions "has a 
destructive effect on human charac-
ter and makes the rehabilitation 
of the individual offender much 
more difficult."12 At time? the re-
sult may even be violent rioting.13 
Finally, lengthy pretrial detention is 
costly. The cost of maintaining a 
prisoner in jail varies from $3 to $9 
per day, and this amounts to mil-
lions across 
[407 US 521] 
the Nation.14 In addi-
tion, society loses wages which 
might have been earned, and it must 
often support families of incar-
cerated breadwinners. 
[5, 6] A second difference between 
the right to speedy trial and the 
accused's other constitutional rights 
is that deprivation of the right may 
work to the accused's advantage. 
Delay is not an uncommon defense 
tactic. As the time between the 
commission of the crime and trial 
lengthens, witnesses may become 
unavailable or their memories may 
fade. Jf the witnesses support the 
prosecution, its case will be weak-
ened, sometimes seriously so. And 
7. Report of the President's Commission 
on Crime in the District of Columbia 256 
(1966). 
8. In Washington, D. C, in 1968, 70.1% 
of the persons arrested for robbery and 
released prior to trial- were re-arrested 
while on bail. Mitchell, Bail Reform and 
the Constitutionality of Pretrial Detention, 
55 Va L Rev 1223, 1236 (1969), citing Re-
port of the Judicial Council Committee to 
Study the Operation of the Bail Reform 
Act in the District of Columbia 20-21 
(1969). 
9. The number of these offenses has been 
increasing. See Annual Report of the 
Director of the Administrative Office of 
the United States Courts, 1971, p 321. 
10. "[I]t is desirable that punishment 
should follow offence as closely as possible; 
for its impression upon the minds of men 
is weakened by distance, and, besides, dis-
tance adds to the uncertainty of punish-
ment, by affording new chances of escape." 
J. Bentham, The Theory of Legislation 326 
(Ogden ed 1931). 
11. To Establish Justice, To Insure Do-
mestic Tranquillity, Final Report of the 
National Commission on the Causes and 
Prevention of Violence 152 (1969). 
12. Testimony of James V. Bennett, Di-
rector, Bureau of Prisons, Hearings on 
Federal Bail Procedures before the Sub-
committee on Constitutional Rights and 
the Subcommittee on Improvements in Ju-
dicial Machinery of the Senate Committee 
on the Judiciary, 88th Cong- 2d Sess, 4& 
(1964). 
13. E. g., the "Tombs" riots in New 
York City in 1970. N. Y. Ti^es, Oct. 3, 
1970, p 1, col 8. 
14. The Challenge of Crime in a Free 
Society, A Report by the President's Com-
mission on Law Enforcement and Admin-
istration of Justice 131 (1967)^ 
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it is the prosecution which carries 
the burden of proof. Thus, unlike 
the right to counsel or the right to 
be free from compelled self-incrimi-
nation, deprivation of the right to 
speedy trial does not per se prej-
udice the accused's ability to defend 
himself. 
[7-9] Finally, and perhaps most 
importantly, the right to speedy 
trial is a more vague concept than 
other procedural rights. It is, for 
example, impossible to determine 
with precision when the right has 
been denied. We cannot definitely 
say how long is too long in a system 
where justice is supposed to be 
swift but deliberate.15 As a conse-
quence, there is no fixed point in 
the criminal process when the State 
can put the defendant to the choice 
of either exercising or waiving the 
right to a speedy trial. If, for ex-
ample, the State moves for 
[407 US 522]
 C A , 
a 60-day 
continuance, granting that continu-
ance is not a violation of the right to 
speedy trial unless the circum-
stances of the case are such that 
further delay would endanger the 
values the right protects. It is im-
possible to do more than generalize 
about when those circumstances ex-
ist. There is nothing comparable to 
the point in the process when a de-
fendant exercises or waives his right 
to counsel or his right to a jury trial. 
Thus, as we recognized in Beavers v 
Haubert, supra, any inquiry into a 
speedy trial claim necessitates a 
functional analysis of the right in 
the particular context of the case: 
15. "[I]n large measure because of the 
many procedural safeguards provided an 
accused, the ordinary procedures for crim-
inal prosecution are designed to move at a 
deliberate pace. A requirement of unrea-
sonable speed would have a deleterious 
effect both upon the rights of the accused 
and upon the ability of society to protect 
itself." United States v Ewell, 383 US 
116, 120, 15 L Ed 2d 627, 630, 86 S Ct 773 
(1966). 
"The right of a speedy trial is nee-
essarily relative. It is consistent 
with delays and depends upon cir-
cumstances. It secures rights to a 
defendant. It does not preclude the 
rights of public justice." 198 US, at 
87, 49 L Ed at 954. 
[l 0] The amorphous quality of the 
right also leads to the unsatisfac-
torily severe remedy of dismissal of 
the indictment when the right has 
been deprived. This is indeed a seri-
ous consequence because it means 
that a defendant who may be guilty 
of a serious crime will go free, with-
out having been tried. Such a rem-
edy is more serious than ai\ exclu-
sionary rule or a reversal for -a new 
trial,18 but it is the only possible 
remedy. 
m 
Perhaps because the speedy trial 
right is so slippery, two rigid ap-
proaches are urged upon us as ways 
of eliminating some of the uncer-
tainty which courts experience 
[407 US 5233 
in 
protecting the right. The first sug-
gestion is that we hold that the Con-
stitution requires a criminal defend-
ant to be offered a trial within a 
specified time period. The result of 
such a ruling would have the virtue 
of clarifying when the right is in-
fringed and of simplifying courts' 
application of it. Recognizing this, 
some legislatures have enacted laws, 
and some courts have adopted proce-
dural rules which more narrowly 
define the right.17 The United States 
16. Mr. Justice White noted in his opin-
ion for the Court in Ewell, supra, at 121, 
15 L Ed 2d at 631, that overzealous appli-
cation of this remedy would infringe "the 
societal interest in trying people accused 
of crime, rather than granting them im-
munization because of legal error. . . ." 
17. For examples, see American Bar As-
sociation Project on Standards for Crim-
inal Justice, Speedy Trial 14-16 (Approved 
Draft 1968); Note, The Right to a Speedy 
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Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit has promulgated rules for 
the district courts in that Circuit 
establishing that the government 
must be ready for trial within six 
months of the date of arrest, except 
in unusual circumstances, or the 
charge will be dismissed.18 This 
type of rule is also recommended by 
the American Bar Association.19 
[11-13] But such a result would 
require this Court to engage in legis-
lative or rulemaking activity, rather 
than in the adjudicative process to 
which we should confine our efforts. 
We do not establish procedural rules 
for the States, except when man-
dated by the Constitution. We find 
no constitutional basis for holding 
that the speedy trial right can be 
quantified into a specified number of 
days or months. The States, of 
course, are free to prescribe a rea-
sonable period consistent with con-
Cnminal Trial, 57 Col L Rev 846, 863 
(1957). 
18. Second Circuit Rules Regarding 
Prompt Disposition of Criminal Cases 
(1971). 
19. ABA Project, supra, n 17, at 14. 
For an example of a proposed statutory 
rule, see Note, The Lagging Right to a 
Speedy Trial, 51 Va L Rev 1587, 1619 
(1965). 
20. E. g., Pines v District Court of 
Woodbury County, 233 Iowa 1284, 10 
NW2d 574 (1943). See generally Note, 
The Right to a Speedy Criminal Trial, 57 
Col L Rev 846, 853 (1957); Note, The 
Lagging Right to a Speedy Trial, 51 Va 
L Rev 1587, 1601-1602 (1965). 
21. See State v Maldonado, 92 Ariz 70, 
373 P2d 583 (en banc), cert denied, 371 US 
928, 9 L Ed 2d 236, 83 S Ct 299 (1962); 
Hicks v People, 148 Colo 26, 364 P2d 877 
(1961) (en banc); People v Prosser, 309 
NY 353, 130 NE2d 891 (1955); Zehrlaut v 
State, 230 Ind 175, 102 NE2d 203 (1951); 
Planary v Commonwealth, 184 Va 204, 35 
SE2d 135 (1945); Ex parte Chalfant, 81 
W Va 93, 93 SE 1032 (1917); State v 
Hess, 180 Kan 472, 304 P2d 474 (1956); 
State v Dodson, 226 Ore 458, 360 P2d 782 
(1961). But see State v Vawter, 236 Ore 
85, 386 P2d 915 (1963). 
22. See United States v Hill, 310 F2d 
[33 L Ed 2d]—8 
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stitutional standards, butj our ap-
proach must be less precis^. 
[14] The second suggested alter-
native would restrict consideration 
[407 US 524] 
of the right to those cases in which 
the accused has demanded a speedy-
trial. Most States have recognized 
what is loosely referred to a^  the "de-
mand rule,"20 although eight States 
reject it.21 It is not clear, however, 
precisely what is meant by that 
term. Although every federal court 
of appeals that has considered the 
question has endorsed sojne kind 
of demand rule, some have regarded 
the rule within the concept of 
waiver,22 whereas others have 
viewed it as a factor to be weighed 
[407 US 525] 
in assessing whether there has been 
a deprivation of the speedy trial 
right.23 We shall refer to the 
former approach as the demand-
• • - ' • ' i 
601 (CA4 1962); Bruce v United States, 
351 F2d 318 (CA5 1965), cert denied, 384 
US 921, 16 L Ed 2d 441, 86 $ Ct 1370 
(1966); United States v Perez, 398 F2d 
658 (CA7 1968), cert denied, 393 US 1080, 
21 L Ed 2d 772, 89 S Ct 851 (I960); Pietch 
v United States, 110 F2d 817 (CJA.10), cert 
denied, 310 US 648, 84 L Ed 1414, 60 
S Ct 1100, 129 ALR 563 (1940); Smith v 
United States, 118 US App DC 38, 331 F2d 
784 (DC 1964) (en banc). The opinion 
below in this case demonstrates that the 
Sixth Circuit takes a similar approach. 
As an indication of the importance which 
these courts have attached to the demand 
rule, see Perez, supra, in which the Court 
held that a defendant waived any speedy 
trial claim, because he knew of an indict-
ment and made no demand for an immedi-
ate trial, even though the recorcj gave no 
indication that he was represented by 
counsel at the time when he should have 
made his demand, and even though he was 
not informed by the court or the prose-
cution of his right to a speedy trial. 
23. Although stating that they recog-
nize a demand rule, the approach of the 
Eighth and Ninth Circuits seems to be 
that a denial of speedy trial can be found 
despite an absence of a demand under 
some circumstances. See Bandy v United 
States, 408 F2d 518 (CA8 1969) (a pur-
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waiver doctrine. The demand-
waiver doctrine provides that a de-
fendant waives any consideration 
of his right to speedy trial for any 
period prior to which he has not 
demanded a trial. Under this rigid 
approach, a prior demand is a neces-
sary condition to the consideration 
of the speedy trial right. This es-
sentially was the approach the Sixth 
Circuit took below. 
[15, 16] Such an approach, by pre-
suming waiver of a fundamental 
right24 from inaction, is inconsistent 
with this Court's pronouncements 
on waiver of constitutional rights. 
The Court has defined waiver as "an 
intentional relinquishment or aban-
donment of a known right or priv-
ilege." Johnson v Zerbst, 304 US 
458, 464, 82 L Ed 1461, 1466, 58 
S Ct 1019, 146 ALR 357 (1938). 
Courts should Indulge every reason-
able presumption against waiver," 
Aetna Ins. Co. v Kennedy, 301 US 
389, 393, 81 L Ed 1177, 1180, 57 
S Ct 809 (1937), and they should 
"not presume acquiescence 
[407 US 526] 
in the 
loss of fundamental rights." Ohio 
Bell Tel. Co. v Public Utilities 
Comm'n, 301 US 292, 307, 81 L Ed 
1093, 1103, 57 S Ct 724 (1937). In 
Carnley v Cochran, 369 US 506, 8 
L Ed 2d 70, 82 S Ct 884 (1962), we 
held: 
poseful or oppressive delay may overcome 
a failure to demand); Moser v United 
States, 381 F2d 363 (CA9 1967) (despite a 
failure to demand, the court balanced 
other considerations). 
The Second Circuit's approach is unclear. 
There are cases in which a failure to 
demand is strictly construed as a waiver. 
E. g., United States v DeMasi, 445 F2d 251 
(1971). In other cases, the Court has 
seemed to be willing to consider claims in 
which there was no demand. E. g., 
United States ex rel. Solomon v Man-
cusi, 412 F2H 88 (CA2), cert denied, 
396 US 93<> *4 L Ed 2d 236, 90 S 
"Presuming waiver from a silent 
record is impermissible. The record 
must show, or there must be an al-
legation and evidence which show, 
that an accused was offered counsel 
but intelligently and understandably-
rejected the offer. Anything less is 
not waiver." Id., at 516, 8 L Ed 2d 
at 77. 
The Court has ruled similarly with 
respect to waiver of other rights 
designed to protect the accused. 
See, e. g., Miranda v Arizona, 384 
US 436, 475-476, 16 L Ed 2d 694, 
724, 86 S Ct 1602, 10 ALR3d 974 
(1966); Boykin v Alabama, 395 US 
238, 23 L Ed 2d 274, 89 S Ct 1709 
(1969). 
[17, 18] In excepting the right to 
speedy trial from the rule of waiver 
we have applied to other funda-
mental rights, courts that have ap-
plied the demand-waiver rule have 
relied on the assumption that delay 
usually works for the benefit of the 
accused and on the absence of any 
readily ascertainable time in the 
criminal process for a defendant to 
be given the choice of exercising or 
waiving his right. But it is not 
necessarily true that delay benefits 
the defendant. There are cases in 
which delay appreciably harms the 
defendant's ability to defend him-
self.25 
[407 US 527] 
Moreover, a defendant con-
Ct 269 (1969). Certainly the District 
Courts in the Second Circuit have not re-
garded the demand rule as being rigid. 
See United States v Mann, 291 F Supp 268 
(SD NY 1968); United States v Dillon, 
183 F Supp 541 (SD NY 1960). 
The First Circuit also seems to reject 
the more rigid approach. Compare United 
States v Butler, 426 F2d 1275 (1970), 
with Needel v Scafati, 412 F2d 761, 
cert denied, 396 US 861, 24 L Ed 2d 113, 
90 SCt 133 (1969). 
24. See n 2, supra. 
25. "If a defendant deliberately by-
passes state procedure for some strategic, 
[33 L Ed 2d] 
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fined to jail prior to trial is obviously 
disadvantaged by delay as is a de-
fendant released on bail but unable 
to lead a normal life because of com-
munity suspicion and his own anxi-
ety. 
[19-21] The nature of the speedy 
trial right does make it impossible 
to pinpoint a precise time in the 
process when the right must be as-
serted or waived, but that fact does 
not argue for placing the burden 
of protecting the right solely on de-
fendants. A defendant has no duty 
to bring himself to trial ;26 the State 
has that duty as well as the duty of 
insuring that the trial is consistent 
with due process.27 Moreover, for 
the reasons earlier expressed, so-
ciety has a particular interest in 
bringing swift prosecutions, and 
society's representatives are the 
ones who should protect that inter-
est. 
[22] It is also noteworthy that 
such a rigid view of the demand-
waiver rule places defense counsel in 
an awkward position. Unless he de-
mands a trial early and often, he is 
in danger of frustrating his client's 
right If counsel is willing to toler-
v WINGO 115 
2d 101, 92 S Ct 2182 
ate some delay because he finds it 
reasonable and helpful in preparing 
his own case, he may be unable to 
obtain a speedy trial for his client 
at the end of that time. Since under 
the demand-waiver rule no time 
[407 US 5281 
runs 
until the demand is made, the gov-
ernment will have whatever time is 
otherwise reasonable to bring the 
defendant to trial after a demand 
has been made. Thus, if the first 
demand is made three months after 
arrest in a jurisdiction which pre-
scribes a six-month rule, the prose-
cution will have a total of nine 
months—which may be wholly un-
reasonable under the circumstances. 
The result in practice is likely to 
be either an automatic, pro forma 
demand made immediately after ap-
pointment of counsel or delays 
which, but for the demand-waiver 
rule, would not be tolerated. Such 
a result is not consistent with the 
interests of defendants, society, or 
the Constitution. 
[23, 24] We reject, therefore, the 
rule that a defendant who fails to 
demand a speedy trial forever 
waives his right.28 This does not 
tactical, or other reason, a federal judge 
on habeas corpus may deny relief if he 
finds that the by-passing was the con-
sidered choice of the petitioner. The de-
mand doctrine presupposes that failure to 
demand trial is a deliberate choice for 
supposed advantage on the assumption 
that delay always benefits the accused, but 
the delay does not inherently benefit the 
accused any more than it does the state. 
Consequently, a man should not be pre-
sumed to have exercised a deliberate choice 
because of silence or inaction that could 
equally mean that he is unaware of the 
necessity for a demand." Note, The 
Lagging Right to a Speedy Trial, 51 Va L 
Rev 1587,1610 (1965) (footnotes omitted). 
26. As Mr. Chief Justice Burger wrote 
for the Court in Dickey v Florida: 
Although a great many accused persons 
seek to put off the confrontation as long 
as possible, the right to a prompt inquiry 
into criminal charges is fundamental asid 
the duty of the charging authority is to 
provide a prompt trial." 398 US 30, 37-
38, 26 L Ed 2d 26, 31, 32, 90 S Ct 1564 
(1970) (footnote omitted). 
27. As a circuit judge, Mr. Justice 
Blackmun wrote: 
"The government and, for that matter, 
the trial court are not without responsi-
bility for the expeditious trial of criminal 
cases. The burden for trial promptness is 
not solely upon the defense. The right to 
'a speedy . . . trial' is constitutionally 
guaranteed and, as such, is not to be hon-
ored only for the vigilant and the knowl-
edgeable." Hodges v United States, 408 
F2d 543, 551 (CA8 1969). 
28. The American Bar Association also 
rejects the rigid demand-waiver rule: 
"One reason for this position is that 
there are a number of situations, such as 
where the defendant is unaware of the 
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basis. We can do little more than 
mean, however, that the defendant 
has no responsibility to assert his 
right. We think the better rule is 
that the defendant's assertion of or 
failure to assert his right to a 
speedy trial is one of the factors to 
be considered in an inquiry into the 
deprivation of the right. Such a 
formulation avoids the rigidities of 
the demand-waiver rule and the re-
sulting possible unfairness in its ap-
plication. It allows the trial court 
[407 US 529] 
to exercise a judicial discretion 
based on the circumstances, includ-
ing due consideration of any appli-
cable formal procedural rule. It 
would permit, for example, a court 
to attach a different weight to a 
situation in which the defendant 
knowingly fails to object from a sit-
uation in which his attorney ac-
quiesces in long delay without ade-
quately informing his client, or from 
a situation in which no counsel is ap-
pointed. It would also allow a court 
to weigh the frequency and force of 
the objections as opposed to attach-
ing significant weight to a purely 
pro forma objection. 
[25, 26] In ruling that a defend-
ant has some responsibility to assert 
a speedy trial claim, we do not 
depart from our holdings in other 
cases concerning the waiver of 
fundamental rights, in which we 
have placed the entire responsibility 
on the prosecution to show that the 
claimed waiver was knowingly and 
voluntarily made. Such cases have 
charge or where the defendant is without 
counsel, in which it is unfair to require a 
demand . . . . Jurisdictions with a 
demand requirement are faced with the 
continuing problem of defining exceptions, 
a process which has not always been car-
ried out with uniformity . . . . More 
important, the demand requirement is in-
consistent with the public interest in 
prompt disposition of criminal cases. . . . 
[T]he trial of a criminal case should not 
involved rights which must be exer-
cised or waived at a specific time or 
under clearly identifiable circum-
stances, such as the rights to plead 
not guilty, to demand a jury trial, 
to exercise the privilege against self 
incrimination, and to have the assist-
ance of counsel. We have shown 
above that the right to a speedy 
trial is unique in its uncertainty as 
to when and under what circum-
stances it must be asserted or may 
be deemed waived. But the rule we 
announce today, which comports 
with constitutional principles, places 
the primary ~ burden on the courts 
and the prosecutors to assure that 
cases are brought to trial. We 
hardly need add that if delay is at-
tributable to the defendant, then his 
waiver may be given effect under 
standard waiver doctrine, the de-
mand rule aside. 
[27] We, therefore, reject both of 
the inflexible approaches—the fixed-
time period because it goes further 
than the Constitution requires; the 
demand-waiver rule because it is in-
sensitive to a right which we have 
deemed 
[407 US 530] 
fundamental. The approach 
we accept is a balancing test, in 
which the conduct of both the pros-
ecution and the defendant are 
weighed.29 
IV 
[28, 29] A balancing test neces-
sarily compels courts to approach 
speedy trial cases on an ad hoc 
be unreasonably delayed merely because 
the defendant does not think that it is in 
his best interest to seek prompt disposi-
tion of the charge." ABA Project, supra, 
n 17, at 17. 
29. Nothing we have said should be in-
terpreted as disapproving a presumptive 
rule adopted by a court in the exercise of 
its supervisory powers which establishes a 
fixed time period within which cases must 
normally be brought. See n 18, supra. 
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basis. We can do little more than 
identify some of the factors which 
courts should assess in determining 
whether a particular defendant has 
been deprived of his right. Though 
some might express them in differ-
ent ways, we identify four such fac-
tors: Length of delay, the reason 
for the delay, the defendant's asser-
tion of his right, and prejudice to 
the defendant.30 
[30] The length of the delay is to 
some extent a triggering mechan-
ism. Until there is some delay 
which is presumptively prejudicial, 
there is no necessity for inquiry into 
the other factors that go into the 
balance. Nevertheless, because of 
the imprecision of the right to 
speedy trial, the length of delay 
that will provoke such an inquiry 
is necessarily dependent upon the 
peculiar 
[407 US 531] 
circumstances of the case.31 
To take but one example, the delay 
that can be tolerated for an ordi-
nary street crime is considerably 
less than for a serious, complex con-
spiracy charge. 
[31] Closely related to length of 
delay is the reason the government 
assigns to justify the delay. Here, 
too, different weights should be as-
signed to different reasons. A delib-
v WINGO 117 
2d 101, 92 S Ct 2182 
arate attempt to delay ihe trial in 
order to hamper the defense should 
be weighed heavily agairist the gov-
ernment.32 A more neutral reason 
such as negligence or overcrowded 
courts should be weighed less heav-
ily but nevertheless should be con-
sidered since the ultimate respon-
sibility for such circumstances must 
rest with the government rather 
than with the defendant. Finally, 
a valid reason, such as a missing 
witness, should serve to justify ap-
propriate delay. 
[32, 33] We have already dis-
cussed the third factor, t(he defend-
ant's responsibility to assert his 
right. Whether and how a defend-
ant asserts his right is closely related 
to the other factors we have men-
tioned. The strength of his efforts 
will be affected by the length of the 
delay, to some extent by the reason 
for the delay, and most particularly 
by the personal prejudice, which is 
not always readily identifiable, that 
he experiences. The more serious 
the deprivation, the moife likely a 
defendant is to complain The de-
fendant's assertion of fyis speedy 
trial right, then, is entitled to strong 
evidentiary weight in determining 
[407 US 532] 
whether the defendant is being de-
prived of the right. We emphasize 
30. See, e. g., United States v Simmons, 
338 F2d 804, 807 (CA2 1964), cert denied, 
380 US 983, 14 L Ed 2d 276, 85 S Ct 1352 
1965); Note, The Right to a Speedy Trial, 
20 Stan L Rev 476, 478, note 15 (1968). 
In his concurring opinion in Dickey, Mr. 
Justice Brennan identified three factors 
for consideration: the source of the delay, 
the reasons for it, and whether the delay 
prejudiced the interests protected by the 
right. 398 US, at 48, 26 L Ed 2d at 38. 
He included consideration of the defend-
ant's failure to assert his right in the 
cause-of-delay category, and he thought 
the length of delay was relevant primarily 
to the reasons for delay and its preju-
dicial effects. Id., n 12. In essence, 
however, there is little difference between 
his approach and the one we adopt today. 
See also Note, the Right to a Speedy Trial, 
supra, for another slightly efferent ap-
proach. 
31. For example, the Ffrst Circuit 
thought a delay of nine months overly 
long, absent a good reason, in a case that 
depended on eyewitness testimony. United 
States v Butler, 426 F2d 1275, 1277 (1970). 
32. We have indicated on previous occa-
sions that it is improper for the prosecu-
tion intentionally to delay "to gain some 
tactical advantage over [defendants] or 
to harass them." United States v Marion, 
404 US 307, 325 (1971). See Pollard v 
United States, 352 US 354, 361, 1 L Ed 
2d 393, 399, 77 S Ct 481 (195?). 
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that failure to assert the right will 
make it difficult for a defendant to 
prove that he was denied a speedy 
trial. 
[34] A fourth factor is prejudice 
to the defendant. Prejudice, of 
course, should be assessed in the 
light of the interests of defendants 
which the speedy trial right was 
designed to protect. This Court has 
identified three such interests: (i) 
to prevent oppressive pretrial in-
carceration; (ii) to minimize anxi-
ety and concern of the accused; and 
(iii) to limit the possibility that the 
defense will be impaired.33 Of 
these, the most serious .is the last, 
because the inability of a defendant 
adequately to prepare his case 
skews the fairness of the entire sys-
tem. If witnesses die or disappear 
during a delay, the prejudice is 
obvious. There is also prejudice if 
defense witnesses are unable to re-
call accurately events of the distant 
past. Loss of memory, however, is 
not always reflected in the record 
because what has been forgotten can 
rarely be shown. 
[35, 36] We have discussed pre-
viously the societal disadvantages 
of lengthy pretrial incarceration, 
but obviously the disadvantages for 
the accused who cannot obtain his 
release are even more serious. The 
time spent in jail awaiting trial has 
a detrimental impact on the individ-
ual. It often means loss of a job; 
33. United States v Ewell, 383 US, at 
120, 15 L Ed 2d, at 630; Smith v Hooey, 
393 US 374, 377-378, 21 L Ed 2d 607, 
610-611, 89 S Ct 575 (1969). In Klop-
fer v North Carolina, 386 US 213, 221-
222, 18 L Ed 2d 1, 6-7, 87 S Ct 988 
(1967), we indicated that a defendant 
awaiting trial on bond might be sub-
jected to public scorn, deprived of em-
ployment, and chilled in the exercise of 
his right to speak for, associate with, and 
participate in unpopular political causes. 
34. See To Establish Justice, To Insure 
Domestic Tranquility, Final Report of the 
it disrupts family life; and it en-
forces idleness. Most jails offer 
little or no recreational or rehabili-
tative programs.34 The time spent 
in 
[407 US 533] 
jail is simply dead time. More-
over, if a defendant is locked up, 
he is hindered in his ability to 
gather evidence, contact witnesses, 
or otherwise prepare his defense.35 
Imposing those consequences on 
anyone who has not yet been con-
victed is-serious. It is especially 
unfortunate to impose them on 
those persons who are ultimately 
fouiid to be innocent. Finally, even 
if an accused is not incarcerated 
prior to trial, he is still disadvan-
taged by restraints on his liberty 
and by living under a cloud of anxi-
ety, suspicion, and often hostility. 
See cases cited in n 33, supra. 
[37] We regard none of the four 
factors identified above as either a 
necessary or sufficient condition to 
the finding of a deprivation of the 
right of speedy trial. Rather, they 
are related factors and must be con-
sidered together with such other cir-
cumstances as may be relevant. In 
sum, these factors have no talis-
manic qualities; courts must still 
engage in a difficult and sensitive 
balancing process.38 But, because 
we are dealing with a fundamental 
right of the accused, this process 
must be carried out with full recog-
National Commission on the Causes and 
Prevention of Violence 152 (1969). 
35. There is statistical evidence that 
persons who are detained between arrest 
and trial are more likely to receive prison 
sentences than those who obtain pretrial 
release, although other factors bear upon 
this correlation. See Wald, Pretrial De-
tention and Ultimate Freedom: A Statis-
tical Study, 39 NYU L Rev 631 (1964). 
36. For an example of how the speedy 
trial issue should be approached, see Judge 
Frankel's excellent opinion in United 
States v Mann, 291 F Supp 268 (SD NY 
1968). 
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nition that the accused's interest in 
a speedy trial is specifically affirmed 
in the Constitution. 
The difficulty of the task of bal-
ancing these factors is illustrated by 
this case, which we consider to be 
close* It is clear that the length 
of delay between arrest and trial— 
well over five years—was extraor-
dinary. Only 
[407 US 534] 
seven months of 
that period can be attributed to a 
strong excuse, the illness of the ex-
sheriff who was in charge of the in-
vestigation. Perhaps some delay 
would have been permissible under 
ordinary circumstances, so that 
Manning could be utilized as a wit-
ness in Barker's trial, but more than 
four years was too long a period, 
particularly since a good part of 
that period was attributable to the 
Commonwealth's failure or inability 
to try Manning under circumstances 
that comported with due process. 
Two counterbalancing factors, 
however, outweigh these deficien-
cies. The first is that prejudice was 
minimal. Of course, Barker was 
prejudiced to some extent by living 
for over four years under a cloud of 
suspicion and anxiety. Moreover, 
although he was released on bond 
for most of the period, he did spend 
10 months in jail before trial. But 
there is no claim that any of Bark-
er's witnesses died or otherwise be-
came unavailable owing to the 
delay. The trial transcript indicates 
only two very minor lapses of 
memory—one on the part of a 
prosecution witness—which were in 
no way significant to the outcome. 
More important than the absence 
of serious prejudice, is the fact that 
Barker did not want a speedy trial. 
Counsel was appointed for Barker 
immediately after his indictment 
v WINGO 119 
2d 101, 92 S Ct 2182 
and represented him throughout the 
period. No question is raised as to 
the competency of sucli counsel.37 
Despite the fact that counsel had 
notice of the motions for continu-
ances,38 the record shows no action 
whatever taken between October 21, 
1958, and February 12, 1962, that 
could be construed as the assertion 
of the speedy trial right. On the 
latter date, in response to another 
motion for continuance, Barker 
moved 
[407 US 535] 
to dismiss the indictment. 
The record does not show on what 
ground this motion was based, al-
though it is clear that no alterna-
tive motion was made for an im-
mediate trial. Instead the record 
strongly suggests that while he 
hoped to take advantage of the 
delay in which he had acquiesced, 
and thereby obtain a dismissal of 
the charges, he definitely did not 
want to be tried. Counsel conceded 
as much at oral argument: 
"Your honor, I would concede that 
Willie Mae Barker probably—I 
don't know this for a fact—probably 
did not want to be tried. I don't 
think any man wants to be tried. 
And I don't consider this & liability 
on his behalf. I don't blame him." 
Tr. of Oral Arg. 39. 
The probable reason for Barker's 
attitude was that he was gambling 
on Manning's acquittal. The evi-
dence was not very strong 
against Manning, as the reversals 
and hung juries suggest, and Barker 
undoubtedly thought that if Man-
ning were acquitted, he would never 
be tried. Counsel also conceded 
this: 
"Now, it's true that the reason 
for this delay was the Common-
wealth of Kentucky's desire to 
secure the testimony of the accom-
37. Tr of Oral Arg 39. 
38. Id., at 4. 
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plice, Silas Manning. And it's true 
that if Silas Manning were never 
convicted, Willie Mae Barker would 
never have been convicted. We 
concede this." Id., at 15.39 
[407 US 536] 
That Barker was gambling on 
Manning's acquittal is also sug-
gested by his failure, following the 
pro forma motion to dismiss filed in 
February 1962, to object to the 
Commonwealth's next two motions 
for continuances. Indeed, it was 
not until March 1963, after Man-
ning's convictions were final, that 
Barker, having lost his gamble, 
began to object to furtHer continu-
ances. At that time, the Common-
wealth's excuse was the illness of 
the ex-sheriff, which Barker has 
conceded justified the further 
delay,40 
[38,39] We do not hold that 
there may never be a situation in 
Mr. Justice White, with whom Mr. 
Justice Brennan joins, concurring. 
Although the Court rejects peti-
tioner's speedy trial claim and af-
firms denial of his petition for 
habeas corpus, 
[407 US 537] 
it is apparent that 
had Barker not-so clearly acquiesced 
in the major delays involved in this 
case, the result would have been 
otherwise. From the Common-
39. Hindsight is, of course, 20/20, but 
we cannot help noting that if Barker had 
moved immediately and persistently for a 
speedy trial following indictment, and if 
he had been successful, he would have un-
doubtedly been acquitted, since Manning's 
testimony was crucial to the Common-
wealth's case. It could not have been an-
ticipated at the outset, however, that Man-
ning would have been tried six times over 
a four-year period. Thus, the decision to 
gamble on Manning's acquittal may have 
been a prudent choice at the time it was 
made. 
which an indictment may be dis-
missed on speedy trial grounds 
where the defendant has failed to 
object to continuances. There may 
be a situation in which the defend-
ant was represented by incompetent 
counsel, was severely prejudiced, or 
even cases in which the continu-
ances were granted ex parte. But 
barring extraordinary circum-
stances, we would be reluctant in-
deed to rule that a defendant was 
denied this constitutional right on 
a record that strongly indicates, as 
does this one, that the defendant did 
not want a speedy trial. We hold, 
therefore, that Barker was not 
deprived of his due process right to 
a speedy trial. 
The judgment of the Court of 
Appeals is 
Affirmed. 
wealth's point of view, it is fortu-
nate that the case was set for early 
trial and that postponements took 
place only upon formal requests to 
which Barker had opportunity to 
object. 
Because the Court broadly essays 
the factors going into constitutional 
judgments under the speedy trial 
provision, it is appropriate to em-
phasize that one of the major pur-
poses of the provision is to guard 
40. At oral argument, counsel for Bar-
ker stated: 
"That was after the sheriff, the ma-
terial witness, was ill; the man who had 
arrested the petitioner, yes. And the Sixth 
Circuit held that this was a sufficient rea-
son for delay, and we don't deny this. We 
concede that this was sufficient for the 
delay from March 1963 to October, but it 
does not explain the delays prior to that." 
Tr of Oral Arg 19-20. 
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